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[L. A. No. 25644. In Bank. Jan. 27, 1961.]

GEORGE B. PAGE, Appellant, v. H. B. PAGE, Respondent.
[1] Partnership -

[2]

[8]

[4]

[6]

Dissolution - By Express Will of Pa.rtner.Evidence tending merely to prove that the partners of a linen
supply partnership expected to meet current expenses from
current income and to recoup their investment if the business
were successful, or a common hope that the partnership earnings would pay ·for all necessary expenses;, aid not establish
even by implication a "definite term or particular undertaking," as l'equired by Corp. Code, § 15031, subd. (1) (b), providing that a partnership may be dissolved by the express will
of any partner when no definite term or pa.rticular nndertaking
is specified.
Id.-Dissolution-By Express Will of partner.-Partnerships
are ordinarily entered into with the hope that they will be
profitable, but that alone does not make them partnerships for
a term and obligate the partners to continue until all losses
over a period of many years have been recovered.
Id.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-Existence
of an improved profit situation, or of bad faith of the partner
seeking termination of a partnership, where he was the sole
owner of a corporation holding a substantial demand note of
the partnership, was irrelevant to the issue whether the partnership was for a term or at will.
Id.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-Though the
Uniform Partnership Act provides that a partnership at will
may be dissolved by the express will of any partner (Corp.
Code, § 15031, subd. (1) (b», this power, like any other power
held by a fiduciary, must be exercised in good faith.
Id.-Relations Between Pa.rtners-Fiduciary Relation.-Partners are trustees for each other and in all proceediJlgs connected with conduct of the partnership every partner is bound
to act in the highest good faith to his copartners and may not
obtain any advantage over him in the partnership affairs by
the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threats or ad.
verse pressure of any kind. Although Civ.Code, § 2411, em·
bodying the foregoing language, was repealed on adoption of the

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Pa.rtnership, § 96; Am.Jur., Partnership,
§ 242.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Partnership, § 46; Am.Jur., Partnership,
§ 128 et seq.
MeK. Dig. References: [1-4, 6-8J Partnership, § 74(2); [5] Partnership, § 38.
.

)
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Uniform Partnl'l'~hil' .\d, it was !lot intended by the adoption
of thnt act to dill,jlli~h thl' fiunciary dutics hetween partners.
[6] ld.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-A partner at
will is not bound to relllain in a partnership, regardless of
whether the Imsinep,s is profitable or unprofitable. A partner
Illay not, however, by use of advcrse pressure "freeze out" a
copartner and approprintc the business to his own use.
[7] ld.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-A partner may
not dissolve a partm'I';;hip to gain the benefits of the business
for himself, unless he fully compensates his copartner for his
share of the prospective bu~illess opportunity. In this regard
his fiduciary duties are at least as great as those of a shareholder of a corporn lioll.
[8] ld.-Dissolution-By Express Will of Partner.-A partner has
the right to dissolve the partnership by express notice to the
other partner. If, however, it is proved that he acted in bad
faith and violated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his own use a new prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his copartner, the dissolution
would be wron;;ful and he would be liable as provided by
Corp. Code, § 15038, subd. (2) (a), relating to rights of partners on wrongful dissolution, for violation of the implied
agreement not to exclude the copartner wrongfully from the
partnership business opportunity.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Barbara County. Ernest D. \Vaguer, Judge. Reversed.
Action to haYe it determined whether an oral partnership
agreement was one at will or for a t.erm. Judgment declaring
the partnership to be one for a term, reversed.
Cavalletto, Webster, Mullen & McCaughey, Trevey, Schwartz
& Wood and Jack A. Otero for Appellant.
Schauer, Ryon & Mdntyrc and Robert W. Mrlntyre for
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant are partners in a
linen supply business ill Santa Maria, California. Plaintiff
appeals from a judgment declaring the partnrrship to be
for a term rather than at will.
The partners enter<'d into an oral partnership agreement
in 1949. 'Within the fil'>-:t t\\'o years eaeh partner <'ontributed
approximately $43,000 for the purehase of land, machinery.
and linen needed to begin the business. From 1949 to 1957
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the enterprise was unprofitable, losing approximately $62,000.
The partnership's major creditor is a corporation, wholly
owned by plaintiff, that supplies the linen and machinery
necessary for the day-to-day operation of the business. This
corporation holds a $47,000 demand note of the partnership.
The partnership operations began to improve in 1958. The
partnership earned $3,824.41 in that year and $2,282.30 in
the first three months of 1959. Despite this improvement
plaintiff wishes to terminate the partnership.
[1] The Uniform Partnership Act provides that a partnership may be dissolved" By the express will of any partner
when no definite term or particular undertaking is specified."
(Corp. Code, § 15031, subd. (1) (b).) The trial court found
that the partnership is for a term, namely, "such reasonable
time as is necessary to enable said partnership to repay from
partnership profits, indebtedness incurred for the purchase
of land, buildings, laundry and delivery equipment and linen
for the operation of such business. . . . " Plaintiff correctly
contends that this finding is without support in the evidence.
Defendant testified that the terms of the partnership were
to be similar to former partnerships of plaintiff and defendant,
and that the understanding of these partnerships was that
"we went into partnership to start the business and let the
business operation pay for itself,-put in SO much money,
and let the business pay itself out." There was also testimony
that one of the former partnership agreements provided in
writing that the profits were to be retained until all obligations
were paid.
Upon cross-examination defendant admitted that the former
partnership in which the earnings were to be retained until
the obligations were repaid was substantially different from
the present partnership. The former partnership was a
limited partnership and provided for a definite term of five
years and a partnership at will thereafter. Defendant insists,
however, that the method of operation of the former partnership showed an understanding that all obligations were to be
r~paid from profits. He nevertheless concedes that there was
no understanding as to the term of the present partnership in
the event of losses. He was asked: " [W] as there any discussion with reference to the continuation of the business in the
event of losses T" He replied, "Not that I can remember."
He was then asked, "Did you have any understanding with
Mr. Page, your brother, the plaintiff in this action, as to how
the obligations were to be paid if there were losses f" He
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replied, "Not that I can remember. I can't remember discussing that at all. W c neVN figured on losing, I guess."
Viewing this evidence most favorable for defendant, it
proves only that the partners expected to meet current expenses from current income and to recoup their investment
if the busincss were successful.
Defendant contends that such an expectation is sufficient
to create a partnership for a term under the rule of Owen
v. Cohen, 19 Ca1.2d 147, 150 [119 P.2d 713J. In that case
we held that when a partner advances a sum of money to a
partnership with the understanding that the amount contributed was to be a loan to the partnership and was to he
repaid as soon as feasible from the prospective profits of the
business, the partnership is for the term reasonably required
to repay the loan. It is truc that Owen v. Cohen, supm, and
other cases hold that partn{'rs may impliedly agree to eontinn<'
in business until a certain sum of money is earned (Mervyn
Investment Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637, 641-642 [194 P. 1037J),
or one or more partners recoup their investments (VaJlgel v.
VangC'l, 116 Ca1.App.2d 615, 625 [254 P.2d 919J), or until
certain debts are paid (011'(;1 V. Colic/!, supm. at p. 1;)0),0;'
until certain property could be disposed of on favorable terms
(Shannon v. Hudson, 161 Cal.App.2d 44, 48 [325 P.2d 1022] ).
In each of these cases, however, the implied agreement found
support in the evidencc.
In Owen v. Cohen, S1lpra, the partners borrowed substantial
amounts of money to launch the enterprise and there was an
understanding that the loans would be repaid from partnership profits. In Vangel v. Vangel, supra, one partner loaned
his copartner money to invest in the partnership with the
understanding that the money would be repaid from partnership profits. In Mervyn 1!11'csfmcnf Co. v. Biber, supra. one
partner contributed all the capital, the other contributerl his
services, and it was understood that upon the repayment of
the contributed capital from partnership profits the partner
who contributed his s<'rvires would rec<,iv(' a oIlc-third intere;t
in the partnership assets. In each of these cascs the court
properly held that the partners impliedly promised to continue
the partnership for a term reasonably required to allow the
partnership to earn sufficient money to accomplish the understood objective. In Sham/1m v. lludson ..wpra, the parties
entered into a joint venture to huild and operate a motei
until it could be sold upon favol'ahle and mutually satisfactory

I
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terms, and the court held that the joint venture was for a
reasonable term sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the
joint venture.
In the instant case, howe,rer, defendant failed to prove an~·
facts from ,vhich an agreement to continue the partnership
for a term may be implied. The understanding to ,vhich defendant testified was no more than a common hope that the
partnership earnings would pay for all the necessary expellses. Such a hope does not establish even by implication
a "definite term or particular undertaldng". as required by
section 15031, subdivision (1) (b), of the Corporations COdl'.
[2] All partnerships are ordinarily entered into with the
hope that they will be profitable, but that alone does not make
t hem all partnerships for a term and obligate the partners to
('ontinue in the partnE'rships until all of the losses over a period
of many years have been recovered.
Defendant contends that plaintiff is acting in bad faith
and is attempting to use his superior financial position to
appropriate the now profitable bnfliness of the partnership.
Defendant has invested $43,000 in the firm, and owing to the
long period of losses his interest in the partnership assets is
very small. The fact that plaintiff's wholly owned corporation holds a $47,000 demand note of the partnershIp may make
it difficult to sell the busiMss as a going concern. Defendant
fears that upon dissolution he will receive very little and
that plaintiff, who is the managing partner and knows how
to conduct the operations of the partnership, will receive a
business that has become very profitable because of the establishment of Vandenberg Air Force Base in its vicinity. Defendant charges that plaintiff has been content to share the
losses but now that the business has become profitable hI.'
wishes to keep all the gains.
[3] There is no showing ill the record of bad faith or that
the improved profit situation is more than temporary. In any
eyent these contentions are irrelevant to the issue whether the
partnership is for a term or at will. Since, however, this action
is for a declaratory judgment and will be the basis for future
action by the parties, it is appropriate to point out that defendant is amply protected by the fiduciary duties of copartners.
[4] Eyen though the Uniform Partnership Act provides
that a partnership at will may he dissolved by the express
will of any partner (Corp. Code, § Ui031, sllbd. (1) (b)), this
power, like any other power held by a fiduciary, must be
exercised in good faith.

)
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------------------._------------------[5 ] We havc often statcd that'· Partners are trustees for

J

each other, and in all proecedings connected with the eontIuet
of the partnership every partner is bound to act in the highest
good faith to his copartner and may not obtain any advantage
over him in the partnership affairs by the slightest misrepresentation, concealment, threat or adverse pressure of any
kind." (Llewelyn v. Levi, 157 Cal. 31, 37 [106 P. 219) ; Richards v. Fraser, 122 Cal. 456, 460 [5;) P. 246]; Yeomans v.
Lysfjord, 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362 [327 P.2d 957]; c/.
MacIsaac v. Poz:o, 26 Cal.2d 809, 81:3 [161 P.2tl 449] ; Corp.
Code, § 15021.) Although Civil Code, section 2411, embodying
the foregoing language, \Vas repealed upon the adoption of
the Uniform Partnership Act, it was not intended by the
adoption of that act to diminish the fiduciary duties between
partners. (See MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Ca1.2d 809, 813 [161
P.2d 449] ; Yeomans v. Lysfjol'd, 162 Cal.App.2d 357, 361-362
[327 P.2d 957].)
[ 6 ] A partner at will is not bound to remain in a partnership, regardless of whether the business is profitable or unprofitable. A partner may not, however, by use of adverse
pressure "freeze out" a copartner and appropriate the business to his own use. [1] A partner may not dissolve a partnership to gain the benefits of the business for himself, unless
he fully compcnsates his copartner for his share of the prospective business opportunity. In this regard his fiduciary duties
are at least as great as those of a shareholder of a corporation.
In the case of In re Security Finance Co., 49 Ca1.2d 370,
376-377 [317 P.2d 1], we stated that although shareholders
representing 50 per cent of the voting power have a right
under Corporations Code, section 4600, to dissolve a corporation, they may not exercise such right in order" to defraud the
other shareholders [citation], to 'freeze out' minority shareholders [citation], or to sell the assets of the dissolved corporation at an inadequate price. [Citation.]"
[8] Likewise in the instant case, plaintiff has the power
to dissolve the partnership by express notice to defendant. If,
however, it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad faith and violated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his
own use the new prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his copartner, the dissolution would be
wrongful and the plaintiff would be liable as provided by subdivision (2) (a) of Corporations Code, section 15038 (rights
of partners upon wrongful dissolution) for violation of the
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implied agreement not.to excluue defendant wrongfully from
the partnership. business opportunity.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., Dooling, J.,
and Wood (Parker), J. pro tem.,- concurred.,
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